Health, growth and welfare: a theoritical appraisal of the long run impact of medical R&D by Bosi, Stefano & Laurent, Thierry
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Health, growth and welfare: a theoritical
appraisal of the long run impact of
medical R&D
Stefano Bosi and Thierry Laurent
University of Evry-Val d’Essonne, Center for Economic Policy
Studies (EPEE)
6. August 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33789/
MPRA Paper No. 33789, posted 29. September 2011 12:10 UTC
Health, Growth and Welfare: a Theoritical
Appraisal of the Long Run Impact of Medical
R&D
Stefano BOSIyand Thierry LAURENTz
Center for Economic Policy Studies (EPEE)
Department of Economics, University of Paris-Evry
August 6, 2011
Abstract
This paper aims at providing a simple economic framework to address
the question of the optimal share of investments in medical R&D in total
public spending. In order to capture the long-run impact of tax-nanced
medical R&D on the growth rate, we develop an endogenous growth model
in the spirit of Barro [1990]. The model focuses on the optimal sharing
of public resources between consumption and (non-health) investment,
medical R&D and other health expenditures. It emphasizes the key role
played by the public health-related R&D in enhancing economic growth
and welfare in the long run.
JEL: H23, H51, I18, O31.
Keywords: public health, medical R&D, public spending, endogenous
growth.
1 Introduction
The issue of the optimal size of specic components of public expenditures 
such as education, health or defence  has been extensively addressed in the
litterature inspired by the seminal paper of Barro [1990], in the framework of
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endogenous growth models in which government spending plays the role of a
productive externality and determines the growth rate of the economy in the
long run. Nevertheless, even if many empirical and theoretical articles have fo-
cused on the e¤ects of health on economic growth, there is little in the literature
on the specic impact of tax-nanced medical R&D on economic growth.
In order to study this question and avoid the so-called public-spending di-
chotomy between utility-enhancing and production-related expenditures, we fo-
cuse on the macroeconomic impact of a tax-nanced medical R&D by distin-
guishing two specic components of health spending: tax-nanced medical R&D
and other health expenditures. In our model, the R&D externalities play a
twofold role as utility-enhancing and production-related public expenditures:
(i) on the one hand, health-related R&D and its applications improve the
performance of medical equipment, i.e. the quality of the health services pro-
vided by the public health sector and, eventually, the global welfare.
(ii) on the other hand, medical R&D increases the total stock of available sci-
entic and technical knowledge, di¤using sooner or later, to the overall economy
and, eventually, promoting a more e¢ cient production process.
The rst mechanism directly a¤ects the consumersutility function, while the
second a¤ects the aggregate production function: tax-nanced medical R&D,
through innovations di¤usion, generates spillovers e¤ects from the health sector
towards the whole productive system.
Even if our main goal is to provide a ne description of the di¤erent compo-
nents of public spending from a theoretical point of view and disentangling the
specic e¤ect of health-related R&D public expenditures, the model developed
in the paper not only considers public medical R&D, but also private non-health
R&D. Because individual rms, when making R&D investments, do not take
into account the positive impact of such investments on other rms and the
overall economy, total private R&D spending is far below its socially optimal
level ; the role of the government is thus to design the appropriate incentive
schemes to encourage private rms to su¢ ciently invest into R&D, to get closer
from the socially optimal level.
Taking into account the two types of R&D tax-nanced medical R&D vs
private (non-medical) R&D allows us to analyze how the government manages
the optimal allocation of tax resources between public funding of health-related
R&D on the one side, and the provision of subsidies to private R&D on the
other side.
The paper is organized as follows. After the presentation of the model (sec-
tion 2) section 3 is devoted to the dynamic general equilibrium analysis. Sections
4 and 5 address the policy issues, while proofs and technicalities are placed in
the appendices.
2 The model
The purpose of this section is to develop a general equilibrium model to address a
policy issue, namely the optimal share of health R&D investment in total public
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expenditure. An appropriate way to capture the impact of health-related R&D
on the growth rate of the economy is to develop an endogenous growth model in
the spirit of Barro [1990]. In our model the economy is assumed to be populated
by three types of agents: households, rms and the government. Their behavior
is characterized in the following subsections.
2.1 Households
Households live an innite number of periods during which they consume a
private consumption good c, a public consumption good b and health public
services denoted by e. The overall level of utility reached by the representative
household is given by the intertemporal utility function:
1X
t=0
t [u (ct) + v (bt) + w (et)] (1)
where 0 <   1= (1 + i) < 1 denotes the discount factor and i > 0 the time-
preference rate.
Overall public health expenditures are divided into two components: med-
ical R&D m and other health expenditures n. Viewed as accumulable stocks
these two components produce the health public good et  e (mt; nt) under
constant returns to scale: e (m; n) = e (m;n). The breakdown of public
health spending between medical R&D and other health expenditures enables
us to disentangle the specic role played by health R&D investments in pro-
ducinng social welfare.
Because the public consumption good (b) and the public health services
(e) are supposed to be 100% publicly funded, households expenditures consist
of private consumption good (c), private investment in capital (k), private
investment in R&D (p) and di¤erent kinds of taxes. At each period of time the
representative household faces the following budget constraint:
ct+kt+1 kkt+pt+1 ppt  (1  k) rktkt+(1  p) rptpt+(1   l)!tlt (2)
where i  1 i, with i = k; p, denotes di¤erent depreciation rates for private
capital and private R&D from a period to another.
Consumption and investment net expenditures are on the left side of equation
(2) while on the right side gures the disposable income with rk and rp the real
returns on capital and on private R&D, ! the real wage and k, p,  l the tax
rates on capital, private R&D and labor income, respectively.1
For simplicity, labor supply is assumed to be inelastic and normalized to
one:
lt = 1 (3)
In such a framework the consumers problem is maximizing the intertemporal
utility function (1) subject to the sequence of constraints (2). Deriving the
1 In this model, the policy maker can take into account the positive externalities associated
with private R&D, by reducing the tax rate on the real returns of private R&D, in order to
raise private R&D investments.
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innite-horizon Lagrangian function with respect to kt, pt and ct, eliminating
the Lagrange multipliers and rearranging the rst-order conditions leads to a
No-Arbitrage Condition, which can be interpreted as an equilibrium condition:
k + (1  k) rkt = p + (1  p) rpt (4)
to an Euler equation:
u0 (ct)
u0 (ct+1)
=  [k + (1  k) rkt+1] (5)
and to the budget constraint (2), now with equality.
Eventually, the optimal solution must satisfy the transversality condition:
lim
t!1t (kt+1 + pt+1) = 0 (6)
In order to simplify future calculations, and to get tractable equations, we
assume that the utility functions u, v and w are characterized by constant
elasticities of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
Assumption 1 CIES preferences:
h (x)  chx
1 1="h   1
1  1="h if "h 6= 1; h (x)  ch lnx if "h = 1 (7)
where h  u; v; w and, without loss of generality, cu + cv + cw = 1.
2.2 Firms
Technology is represented by a production function which processes six inputs:
three choice variables for the rm its stock of capital (k), its stock of knowledge
resulting from its past and current investments in R&D (p), the labor demand
(l)  and three externalities  the stock of (health-unrelated) public capital
(a), the stock of knowledge resulting from public investments in medical R&D
(m) and, eventually, the average stock of knowledge resulting from other rms
private investments in R&D (p). The public capital a, viewed as a productive
externality, is simply the result of the accumulation of all past and current public
expenditures generating productive externalities. Health R&D expenditures
also a¤ect the global productivity through a standard R&D externality.
Assumption 2 (i) The production function F (k; p; l; a;m; p) exhibits con-
stant returns to scale in capital, private R&D and labor:
F (k; p; l; a;m; p) = F (k; p; l; a;m; p)
(ii) The intensive production function ~f (; ; a;m; p)  F (; ; 1; a;m; p), where
  k=l and   p=l is supposed to be homogeneous of degree one with respect
to its arguments:
~f (; ; a; m; p) =  ~f (; ; a;m; p)
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Producers maximizes the prot F (kt; pt; lt; at;mt; pt)   rktkt   rptpt   !tlt
with respect to the capital stock kt, the R&D pt and the labor force lt, consid-
ering all the externalities i.e. a, m and p as constants. The rm equilibrium
is thus dened by the equality between the real cost and the productivity of
each input i.e. in terms of the intensive production function:
rkt = ~f (t; t; at;mt; pt) (8)
rpt = ~f (t; t; at;mt; pt)
!t = ~f (t; t; at;mt; pt)  t ~f (t; t; at;mt; pt)  t ~f (t; t; at;mt; pt)
2.3 Government
The overall stock of public capital g is the sum of the stocks of (i) health-
unrelated public capital a (public networks substructures, education etc.), (ii)
public consumption b, (iii) knowledge m resulting from public investments in
health R&D and (iv) other non-R&D health spending n (medical equipment,
current wages, hospital buildings and so on): gt  at + bt +mt + nt. All these
stocks result from accumulation of ows and depreciation across time.
The government budget constraint at time t is thus given by:
at+1  aat + bt+1  bbt +mt+1  mmt + nt+1  nnt
 krktkt + prptpt +  l!tlt (9)
where i  1  i is the depreciation rate of the public capital of type i, the
right-hand side of (9) representing the total amount of tax receipts.2
In such an economy the economic policy of the government is simply de-
scribed by the tax vector (k; p;  l) and the breakdown of the public "capital"
g into its four components:
(a; b; m; n)  (at=gt; bt=gt;mt=gt; nt=gt) (10)
with, of course,
a + b + m + n = 1 (11)
Using the sharing (10) and the budget constraint, equation (9) can be rewrit-
ten
gt+1  gt  krktkt + prptpt +  l!tlt (12)
where the depreciation factor of public capital g can be viewed as a weighted
average of specic depreciation factors:
  aa + bb + mm + nn (13)
2A lag could be introduced between scal revenues and public expenditures, but this would
not change the long-term analysis and the stationary state of the model.
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Notice that the "usual" breakdown of the total amount of public spend-
ing into four ow components  investment (excluding health), consumption,
medical R&D and other health expenditures can be recovered as:3
(~a; ~b; ~m; ~n) 

at+1  aat
gt+1  gt ;
bt+1  bbt
gt+1  gt ;
mt+1  mmt
gt+1  gt ;
nt+1  nnt
gt+1  gt

(14)
still with ~a + ~b + ~m + ~n = 1.
3 Equilibrium dynamics
The equilibrium in the labor market is characterized by an inelastic labor supply
(cf. (3)): in order to compute the general equilibrium, we focus on the markets
of inputs and goods. Since all (competitive) rms are identical, we have in
equilibrium: pt = pt = t and, since lt = 1,4
rktkt + rptpt + !tlt = rktt + rptt + !t
= ~f (t; t; at;mt; t)  f (t; t; at;mt) (15)
Let us now dene ve elasticities of interest:
skt  f (t; t; at;mt)t
f (t; t; at;mt)
=
rktt
f (t; t; at;mt)
spt 
~f (t; t; at;mt; pt)t
~f (t; t; at;mt; pt)
=
rptt
f (t; t; at;mt)
st  f (t; t; at;mt)t
f (t; t; at;mt)
= 1  skt   sat   smt
sat  fa (t; t; at;mt) at
f (t; t; at;mt)
smt  fm (t; t; at;mt)mt
f (t; t; at;mt)
The rst two elasticities are the shares of capital and private R&D revenues in
total income.
In order to simplify the analytical results, but without a substantial loss of
generality, we assume a common depreciation rate between private research and
capital:
Assumption 3 p = k.
Moreover, we assume also that the shares of capital income and private R&D
in total income are constant as in the case of a Cobb-Douglas technology.
3The link between  and ~ becomes an explicit function at the steady state (see formula
(85) in the Appendix 2).
4We notice that f (; ; a;m) is still homogeneous of degree one and f (; ; a;m) =
~f (; ; a;m; ).
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Assumption 4 The elasticities vector (skt; spt; sat; smt) = (sk; sp; sa; sm) is
constant.
In addition, we introduce three variables of interest in order to compute the
endogenous growth dynamics:
xt  t=gt
yt  ct=gt (16)
t  gt+1=gt (17)
Finally, we dene the tax pressure as an average tax rate
  skk + spp + (1  sk   sp)  l (18)
and the intensive production function as follows:
' (xt)  f

xt;
1  p
1  k
spt
skt
xt; a; m

The following proposition characterizes the intertemporal equilibrium. The
rst equation comes from the Euler equation, while the second from the budget
constraint. The details of the proof are presented in the Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 Under the Assumptions 1-4, an intertemporal equilibrium with
perfect foresight is a sequence (xt; yt)
1
t=0 that satises (i) the initial conditions
(k0; g0), (ii) the transitional dynamics:
[ + ' (xt)]
yt+1
yt
=



k + (1  k) sk
sk + s
'0 (xt+1)
"u
(19)
yt +

1 +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk

(xt+1  kxt) =

1    

1 +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk

xt+1

' (xt)
(20)
for t = 0; 1; : : :, and (iii) the transversality condition (6).
Proof. See the Appendix 1.
We observe that these equations constitute a two-dimensional dynamic sys-
tem in (xt; yt) where only the variable xt is predetermined. yt inherits the status
of jump variable from ct.
3.1 Stationary state
In order to compute the steady state, we solve the system (19-20) after canceling
out the time subscripts:
 =  + ' (x) =



k + (1  k) sk
sk + s
'0 (x)
"u
(21)
y =

1 +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk

(k  )x+

1    

1 +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk

x

' (x)
(22)
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Growth is balanced (usual arguments of endogenous growth theory apply):
  gt+1=gt = ct+1=ct = kt+1=kt = pt+1=pt. Noticing that t = tu0 (ct) and
using (7), the transversality condition (6) becomes5 1 1="u < 1. Thus, we get
 < k +  from (21), where   (1  k) rk = (1  k)'0 (x) sk= (sk + s) is
the after-tax return on capital.
3.2 Local dynamics
Raising the question of saddle-path stability is not a mere theoretical matter.
Indeed, as shown by Blanchard and Quah [1989], saddle-path stability implies
the uniqueness of equilibrium under rational expectations.
In this section, we show, without introducing additional restrictions on the
fundamentals, that the equilibrium is a saddle path and converges to the station-
ary state. Our proof is su¢ ciently general to show the uniqueness of equilibrium
as a robust feature of Barro-like models.
In the saddle case, the converging path is the unique solution of the dynamic
system under rational expectations because the other trajectories either make
some variable negative, soon or later, or violate the transversality condition.
Since x0 is a predeterminate variable, the control variable y0 jumps to ensure
that the starting point (x0; y0) belongs to the saddle path.
The following proposition proves the uniqueness of equilibrium transition.
Proposition 2 (Saddle-path stability) Under the Assumptions 1-4, the general
equilibrium with rational expectations is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 recovers the equilibrium determinacy of Barro [1990] where,
however, dynamics are poorer due to the lack of short-run transitions. The
economy jumps from the very beginning on the steady state because dynamics
are driven by a simple equation with one non-predetermined variable and an
unstable eigenvalue. In our model, determinacy still prevails, but equilibrium
transitions becomes possible.
4 Optimal policy
As seen above, a key issue of this model is to nd the optimal (welfare-maximizing)
breakdown of public capital (g) into four components: productive public capital
(a), public consumption (b), stock of knowledge issued from public investments
in medical R&D (m) and other public expenditures on health (n). Until now,
economic agents (households and rms) were supposed to solve their programs,
taking as given the economic policy, i.e. the tax rates and the breakdown of
public capital into these four components. Now the government is supposed
to compute the optimal policy, that is the vector of optimal shares of public
capital and tax rates
 
a; 

b ; 

m; 

n; 

k; 

p; 

l

, given the private agentsbest
5Simply, solve the limit: limt!1 cuc
 1="u
0 (k0 + p0) 
 
1 1="u
t
= 0.
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responses. As the di¤erent shares resulting from the breakdown of public capital
add up to unity (cf. (11)): a + b + m + n = 1, the number of policy tools
reduces to six endogenous variables and policy making sums up to computing
and announcing an optimal vector
 
a; 

m; 

n; 

k; 

p; 

l

.
Under an inelastic labor supply and no restrictions on the tax rates, it is
straightforward that the optimal policy would be a corner solution consisting in
levying taxes on labor income at a full rate (l = 1) and subsidizing (

k; 

p < 0)
the inputs that generate positive externalities i.e. private capital and private
R&D. In order to rule out such nonsensical policy, we assume the same tax rate
 q on capital and labor income:  q  k =  l. This restriction is far from being
unrealistic and is compatible with a balanced growth path.6 A common tax rate
on capital and labor implements an interior solution because capital supply is
elastic and the capital is an essential input in the production function (see the
Inada conditions).
This restriction on tax rates brings back to ve the number of policy vari-
ables, while leaving the tax rate p on private R&D an independent tool; we can
freely play with p in order to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of subsidizing
private investments in R&D.
4.1 Characterization
The shortcut of a representative agent, makes equivalent for the government to
maximize, with respect to the ve policy tools (a; m; n; p;  q), any social
welfare function strictly increasing in the individual utilities or the repre-
sentative agents utility function (1).
To keep things as simple as possible, let us focus directly on the case of
regular growth (in the long-run the equilibrium will be su¢ ciently close to the
steady state).7
We will use a Cobb-Douglas production function not only to satisfy the ho-
mogeneity property (see Assumption 2 and (15)): f (; ; a; m) = f (; ; a;m),
but also to simplify numerical simulations. Similarly, we assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function for medical care.
Assumption 5 The production functions F and e are specied as follows:
F (k; p; l; a;m; p) = kskpsp l1 sk spasamsm p1 sk sp sa sm
e (m; n)  Bmm nn
with m + n = 1.
6Leisure demand is bounded and can not grow as the other arguments in the utility func-
tion, namely private and public consumption. The King-Plosser-Rebelo utility function can
not be considered because of separability.
7 In fact, because of the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we could compute utility along
a transitional path, whenever the starting point stands o¤ the steady state, and maximize
its value with respect to the policy parameters, but it would drive us to hard analytical
computations. As the main goal of the paper is to analyze long-run policy e¤ects, we can
focus on the steady state or transitional equilibria close enough (by continuity, the optimal
rule will change little along an equilibrium path in a neighborhood of the stationary state).
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Eventually, we restrict ourselves to the case of logarithmic utility functions,
which are easier to handle and widespread in the RBC literature.
Assumption 6 u (c)  cu ln c, v (b)  cv ln b, w (e)  cw ln e.
A logarithmic utility function corresponds to the case of a unit elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. The social welfare function becomes,
W =
1X
t=0
tcu ln ct +
1X
t=0
tcv ln bt +
1X
t=0
tcw ln et (23)
where, without loss of generality:
cu + cv + cw = 1 (24)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal policy in terms of rst-
order conditions and generalizes the well-known Barros (1990) result which
recommends to implement a scal pressure equal to the share of public good
externalities in total income (the more productive the public good, the higher
the taxation levied to nance it).
Proposition 3 Under the Assumption 3, 5, 6, the optimal policy which maxi-
mizes the welfare function (23) along the balanced-growth path is a vector
(a; b ({) ; m ({) ; n ({) ; k ({) ; p ({) ;  q ({))
where { = ('; a) is solution of a two-dimensional system:
F1 ('; a) = 0 (25)
F2 ('; a) = 0 (26)
The explicit form of functions b, m, n, k, p,  q, F1, F2 is provided in the
Appendix 1.
Proof. See the Appendix 1.
4.2 Numerical computation
The purpose of this subsection is to compute the optimal economic policy 
a; 

b ; 

m; 

n; 

p; 

q ; 
 characterized above (see Proposition 3). As the an-
alytical resolution of the system is not possible, we x plausible values for the
structural parameters and we solve the resulting system.
4.2.1 Parametrization
The yearly rate of time preference is plausibly set equal to 4%. As our model
does not allow us to distinguish between the depreciation rate of private capital
k and the depreciation rate of private R&D p, we assume a common 8% annual
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depreciation rate for both types of capital, corresponding approximately to a
50% depreciation after 8:5 years. To avoid any bias in favor of public medical
R&D and to be consistent with the calibration of the other depreciation rates,
we set to 8% the depreciation rate m of the stock of knowledge issued from
public investments in health-related R&D.
The depreciation rate a of productive public capital is set to 5% to take
into account that public and private capital usually depreciate at di¤erent rates,
reecting (i) the casual observation that some types of governmentally supplied
infrastructure (e.g. roads, port facilities, nuclear power stations, etc.) are
typically more durable than those provided by private agents, (ii) the fact that
a signicant part of public investment is devoted to increase human capital
which is characterized by a lower depreciation rate, often below 2%, than the
depreciation rate of physical capital.
Finally, the depreciation rate b of public consumption is set at 100% (full
yearly depreciation) whereas the depreciation rate of ordinary health expen-
ditures (n) which is a weighted average of a 100% depreciation rate asso-
ciated with public health consumption (wage bill of the public health sector,
drugs/medical consumption refunded by social security administrations, etc.)
and the lower depreciation rates associated with medical equipment, hospital
buildings, etc. is set at 61%.8 The share sk of capital remuneration in GDP
is set to 75% according to the empirical estimates by Mankiw, Romer & Weil
[1992], Aghion & Howitt [1997] and other empirical estimates. sk is a measure of
both human and physical capital share in total income, while 1 sk = sa+sm+
sp represents the overall weight of the three productive externalities associated
with public capital (a), private R&D (p) and medical R&D (m).
In order to provide a conservative evaluation of the macroeconomic impact
of R&D expenditures and to avoid any overestimation, we minimize the size of
public and private R&D externalities by setting sp = sm = 1%.
With the same thought in mind, we chose (i) to limit the relative weight
of the health public good in the households utility function  i.e. the indirect
impact of health-related R&D on social welfare by considering that households
strongly prefer private consumption and public consumption: cu = cv = 46%
i.e. cw = 8%,9 (ii) to limit the direct role played by medical R&D in the
production of health services: m = 10%.
This set of conservative and, in a way, pessimistic assumptions, about the
R&D mechanisms at work in the economy, should shield us from criticisms about
a possible overestimation of their e¤ects on the equilibrium growth rate and on
social welfare.
Finally, the productivity parameter  is set to 0:5631. More precisely, the
8 In France, the amount of public health investment (investment in public hospitals, ex-
cluding consumption of intermediate goods) in 2006, was around 5:2 billions e, representing
approximately 4% of non-R&D public health expenditures. This means that 96% of these
expenditures are in fact pure consumption. In such a case, given a 100% depreciation rate for
the consumption part and a 6% depreciation rate for the investment part, one gets an average
61% depreciation rate for non-R&D public health expenditures.
9Notice that the share of the total amount of public health expenditures in GDP in France
is approximately equal to 9%; setting cw = 8% is a conservative but reasonable hypothesis.
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TFP is revealed by the observed growth rate: we calibrated  to generate a
growth rate of the economy corresponding to its average yearly value observed
in the French economy during the last decade (2%), while setting the policy
parameters (~a; ~b; ~m; ~n; p;  q; ) to the values experienced in 2006.10
4.2.2 Results
In order to compute the optimal policy, we solve numerically the implicit system
in Proposition 3. The optimal values we are looking for are:
(i) the breakdown of the public capital into the four components: a, b,
m and n,
(ii) the breakdown of the total amount of public spending into the four
components: ~a, ~b, ~m and ~n,
(iii) the tax pressure (average tax rate)  and its breakdown into the tax
rate on labor and capital income  q and the specic tax rate on private R&D
p,
(iv) the growth rate of the economy:    1,
(v) the social welfare: W .
Concerning the growth rate and scal pressure, results are somewhat usual,
in line with the endogenous growth literature à la Barro [1990]. The overall tax
rate of the economy stands to 15:2% and generates an equilibrium growth rate
of the economy equal to 9:3%; these ndings are consistent with those generally
found in the endogenous growth literature where an optimal tax rate under 20%
can sustain a 10% growth rate of the economy.11 The specic tax rate on labor
and capital income stands at 15:5%, i.e. above the overall tax rate, allowing the
government to save scal resources in order to subsidize private R&D through
an appropriate transfer characterized by a negative  13:1% tax rate on private
R&D income. The usual breakdown of the total amount of public spending
into the four components  investment (46:6%), consumption (44:6%), health
R&D (2:6%) and other health expenditures (6:2%) highlights the central roles
played by public medical research and development. Despite a pessimistic set of
assumptions concerning the role played by the R&D in the global economy, 2:6%
of the total amount of public spending should be devoted to medical R&D, in
order for the government to implement an optimal scal policy. This result can
be usefully compared to the real value observed in France during the year 2006.12
In that year public health R&D amounted to 2:95 billions e for a total amount
of scal revenues of 792:49 billions e, which corresponds to a 0:37% share of
medical R&D into public spending. According to our numerical simulation, the
10An extensive calibration of the model and the evaluation of (~a; ~b; ~m; ~n; p; q ; ) are
provided in the next subsection.
11 In Barro [1990] the second best scal pressure has to be equal to the production elasticity
w.r.t. the externality of public spending, that is, under a Cobb-Douglas technology, to 1  ,
where  is the capital share in total income. 1    can be small under weak externalities
(according to empirical estimates), consistently with the assumption (usually retained in the
endogenous growth literature) that capital includes human capital (as in Mankiw, Romer and
Weil [1992]).
12See Fenina & Ge¤roy [2007] and Appendix 3.
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public investment in medical R&D, is 17:6 billions e under its socially optimal
level.
With regard to the sensitivity of the optimal policy to the deep parameters,
one can clearly distinguish two subsets of parameters:
(i) Our main conclusions are relatively insensitive to certain parameters in
the householdsutility function (weights cu, cv and cw), to the parameters in the
provision of public health services (elasticities m and n) or to the depreciation
rates (k, a, b, m and n).
(ii) Our results are sensitive to the assumptions made on the main pro-
duction function (parameters sk, sa, sm and sp). An increase of the size of
the externality associated with medical R&D (resp. public investment) leads
the government to reallocate its scal receipts in favor of medical R&D (resp.
public investment). Symmetrically reducing externalities associated with public
spending (medical R&D or public investment) leads the government to reallo-
cate spending in favor of public consumption.
5 Raising public investment in medical R&D:
an evaluation
The purpose of this section is to to calibrate our model using French data
and to present the results of additional numerical simulations that use these
data. In particular, we analyze the macroeconomic impact on the GDP and
the growth rate of the economy of increasing public investment in medical R&D
and compare the results with another possible public policy: subsidizing private
R&D. The rst part of this section is devoted to the calibration of the model
using French data which includes the current economic policy. The second part
presents the main results of our numerical simulations.
5.1 Calibration
The calibration process consists to set the values of two types of parameters
needed to implement the numerical simulations:
(i) The structural parameters of the model. These deep parameters have
been already dened in the previous section; in order to draw a coherent picture,
we use in this section the same values that the ones employed to compute the
optimal policy.
(ii) Other parameters which were endogenous in the optimal policy section
(see above), are made exogenous and xed according to the observed policy
practice in the French economy. These parameters are the proportion in the
total amount of tax receipts of public investment, public consumption, health
R&D and other health expenditures; the tax rate on labor and capital incomes
and the tax rate on private R&D income; and the GDP growth rate. The level of
GDP, expressed in e, is also used as a convenient basis for providing a monetary
evaluation of the impact on the French economy of increasing public investments
in medical R&D (rather than providing only the impact on the growth rate).
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All theses parameters are taken from French national accounts for the year
2006. The shares, in the total amount of scal revenues, of public investment
(~a), public consumption (~b), health-related R&D (~m) and other (unproduc-
tive) health expenditures (~n), are derived from Table 6 (see Appendix 3). For
instance, the amount of health-related public R&D, is 2:95 billions e for the
year 2006. This represents 0:37% of the total amount of scal receipts; thus
we obtain ~m = 0:37. The same method was used to compute: ~a = 7:58%,
~b = 75:88% and ~n = 16:17%.
The ratio of the total amount of taxes (792:49 billions e in 2006) to the
French 2006 GDP (1792 billions e) determines the French scal pressure in
2006, namely  = 44; 22%. Since the overall tax rate of the economy  is dened
in equation (18) as a weighted average of the specic tax rates applied to private
capital incomes (k) , private R&D incomes (p), and labor incomes ( l), one
gets immediately  q  (   spp) = (1  sp), where  q denotes the common tax
rate on capital and labor income. This formula allow us to compute the tax rate
applied to capital and labor incomes as a function (i) of the overall tax rate of
the economy  and (ii) of the specic tax rate applied to private R&D incomes.
In order to be consistent with the parametrization of the aggregate produc-
tion, we assume that private R&D returns represents, approximately, 1% of the
GDP, i.e. 17:92 billions e for the year 2006. Such incomes would generate,
if taxed at the average level  , a total amount of taxes equal to 44:22% times
17:92 billions e, that is 7:92 billions.
Considering that the so-called Research Tax Credit (RTC), the main tax
measure aimed at supporting the development of private R&D, represents an
annual cost of about 1:1 billion e for the government budget for year 2006,
one can calculate that the total amount of taxes on private R&D incomes is
about 7:92   1:1 = 6:82 billions e. Dividing this latter amount of taxes by
the corresponding amount of incomes (17:92 billions), one can approximate the
value of the specic tax rate on private R&D incomes: p = 38; 09% and, nally,
compute  q = 44; 29%.
The yearly real growth rate of the economy has been set equal to 2%,
corresponding to the average value observed in the French economy during
the last decade, as explained above. In order to have a coherent representa-
tion of the economy, we need to calibrate the productivity parameter  (TFP)
which implements the observed growth rate. Using the observed policy values
(~a; ~b; ~m; ~n; p;  q; ) derived above from the national accounts, and the cali-
bration of the structural parameters presented in Table 1, we obtain:  = 0:5631.
The details of this procedure are provided in the Appendix 2.
5.2 Results
In this section, we proceed to numerical simulations of the model to address the
following questions:
(i) What is the macroeconomic impact on the growth rate of the economy
and the GDP of an increase of public investment in medical R&D?
(ii) Does this impact depend on the way it is nanced?
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(iii) Is it better, from a public policy point of view, to use public money to
increase public medical R&D or to subsidize private R&D?
5.2.1 Increasing public investment in medical R&D
 First, we assume that the government keeps constant the (ex-ante) total
amount of scal receipts and just switches some scal resources (1 billion e)
from somewhat "unproductive" public consumption to investments in medical
R&D. In this case, the policy change we simulate, is a permanent transfer of an
amount of 1 billion e from public consumption to public medical R&D. Such a
transfer raises the share of public spending in medical R&D from ~m = 0:372%
to about ~0m = 0:498%, while the public consumption share decreases from
~b = 75:873% to ~0b = 75:747% (~a and ~n remaining constants). This change
in policy corresponds to an extra-investment in medical R&D of one billion
euros under the balanced-budget constraint ~a + ~0b + ~
0
m + ~n = 1.
In the rst year the growth rate increases from 2% to about 2:24 %. Over a
decade, the GDP discounted total benet associated with the policy change is
more than 60 billions e, corresponding to 3:42% of the 2006 GDP, i.e. about 1:7
years of economic growth; after ten years the amount of annual scal receipts is
5:157 billions e higher that it would have been without the policy adjustment.
In the long run, using public money previously devoted to public consumption,
to increase medical R&D public investment, generates an increase of the growth
rate of the economy equal to +0:048%.
 Let us now compare the previous results to what is obtained if the govern-
ment nances the one billion e increase in medical-R&D public investment, by
increasing the tax rate on labor and capital incomes (i.e. not keeping constant
the total amount of scal receipts). In this case, the policy change we analize,
is a permanent e1 billion increase of public medical-R&D expenditures, totally
funded by a rise of the tax rate on labor and capital incomes.
First we compute the increase of the tax rate  q on labor and capital
income in order to compensate the 1 billion e increase of public medical-
R&D expenditures and keep a balanced budget. We know that total scal
receipts are given by T = Y = [psp +  q (1  sp)]Y . Then, the variation
of T associated with an increase of the tax rate from  q to  0q is given by
T =
 
 0q    q

(1  sp)Y . Setting T = 1 (billion e), we can easily compute
the increase of the tax rate  q on labor and capital income which ensures a
balanced budget:  0q =  q + 1= [(1  sp)Y ] = 44:34%, since Y , the 2006 GDP,
is 1792 billions e. The new proportions, for the four components of the total
amount of scal revenues (public consumption, public investment, health-related
R&D and "other" health expenditures) are given by: 
~0a; ~
0
b; ~
0
m; ~
0
n

=

~aT
T + 1
;
~bT
T + 1
;
~mT + 1
T + 1
;
~nT
T + 1

= (7:57; 75:78; 0:5; 16:15) %
since T , the 2006 tax receipt, is 792:49 billions e.
In the rst year the growth rate increases from 2% to about 2:21% (i.e.
+0:21%) , which is less than what we got with the rst scenario. Over a decade
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the GDP discounted total benet associated with the policy change is close to
55 billions e corresponding approximately to 3% of 2006 GDP i.e. 1:5 year of
economic growth. In the long run the growth rate of the economy stands to
2:043% (+0:043%).
 Results associated with the two scenarios are in fact close to each others.
The macroeconomic impact on the GDP of a 1 billion e increase in public in-
vestment in medical-R&D is clearly positive and strong, whatever the funding
process. However, the impact of increasing publicly funded medical-R&D ap-
pears to be higher when the supplementary investment is nanced by a transfer
from public consumption, than when it is nanced by increasing the tax rate
on labor and capital incomes. Unsurprisingly, in the latter case, the increase in
the overall tax rate of the economy adversely a¤ects, rst, labor and investment
incentives and then the GDP and scal revenues.
5.2.2 Subsidizing private R&D
 We assume here that the government, in order to stimulate private R&D,
switches some scal resources (1 billion e) from public consumption to the
Research Tax Credit (RTC) tool. In this case, the policy change we simulate,
is a permanent 1 billion e decrease of taxes on private R&D incomes, totally
funded by a decrease of the same amount of public consumption. Such a change
decreases the total amount of taxes on private R&D incomes from 6:82 to 5:82
billions e driving the specic tax rate on private R&D incomes from p =
38; 09% to  0p = 32; 51%. The tax rate  q on labor and capital incomes being
constant ( q = 44; 29%), we easily compute the new average taxe rate of the
economy  0 =  0psp+ q (1  sp) = 44:17% and the new proportions, for the four
components of the total amount of scal revenues: 
~0a; ~
0
b; ~
0
m; ~
0
n

=

~aT
T   1 ;
~bT   1
T   1 ;
~mT
T   1 ;
~nT
T   1

= (7:59; 75:85; 0:37; 16:19) %
where T = 792:49 denotes the initial level of taxes.
In the rst year the growth rate of the economy increases from 2% to about
2:02% (i.e. +0:02%), far less that what one gets by rising public investment
in medical R&D (whatever the funding process). Over a decade the GDP dis-
counted total benet associated with the policy change, stands under 11 billions
e corresponding approximately to 0:61% of 2006 GDP i.e. 0:3 year of economic
growth; after ten years the amount of annual scal receipts is only 0:128 billions
e higher that it would have been without the policy adjustment. In the long
run, using public money previously devoted to public consumption, to subsidize
private R&D, generates an increase of the growth rate of the economy equal to
+0:014%.
We now compare the previous results with what we get if the governement
instead of decreasing public consumption in order to keep a balanced budget
decides to nance the 1 billion e increase of the RTC, by increasing the tax
rate on labor and capital incomes. The policy change we analize, is thus a
permanent e1 billion decrease of the amount of taxes on private R&D incomes,
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totally o¤set by a increase of the amount of taxes on labor and capital incomes.
Like before, the total amount of taxes on private R&D incomes shifts from
6:82 to 5:82 billions e driving the specic tax rate on private R&D incomes
to  0p = 32; 51%, but now the total amount of taxes (T = 792:49 billions e)
remains constant and it is the same for the average taxe rate of the economy
( = 44; 22%); we thus easily compute the new tax rate on labor and capital
incomes  0q 
 
   sp 0p

= (1  sp) = 44:34%. Futhermore it is straightforward
that the vector (~a; ~b; ~m; ~n) remains the same.
The impact of this policy shock on the growth rate of the economy is
about +0:03% in the short run (one year), but is close to zero in the long
run (+0:002%); once again far less that what one gets by promoting medical
R&D public investment. Over a decade the GDP discounted total benet asso-
ciated with the policy change is under 5 billions e corresponding approximately
to 0:3% of 2006 GDP i.e. less than 2 months of economic growth.
 Like in the previous subsection, results associated with the two scenarios
are close to each others and, once again, the funding process seems to play a
second order role : the macroeconomic impact on the GDP of a 1 billion e
decrease of of taxes on private R&D incomes is positive but weak, whatever the
funding process.
6 Conclusion
The general equilibrium endogenous growth model presented in this paper em-
phasizes the key role played by public health R&D investments in determining
the long-run rate of economic growth and welfare.
From a theoretical point of view we found four main results: (i) the equi-
librium path is unique, (ii) market imperfections  externalities and taxes 
make the equilibrium ine¢ cient under arbitrary policies, (iii) an appropriate
scal policy (tax rate and public spending shares) can achieve the second best,
(iv) health R&D matters more than other health expenditures in achieving the
social welfare target in the long run. This last point is crucial as it stresses
how the health-related research and development, as a productive externality,
is a powerful engine for growth compared to alternative policies such as, for
example, public consumption.
The numerical simulations provided in the paper can be seen as an illustra-
tion of possible benets associated with a permanent increase of medical R&D
public investment. More precisely, we found that such an increase has a strong
impact on the growh rate of the economy, whatever the funding process (reallo-
cating public money from "unproductive" public consumption to medical R&D
or rising the tax rate on labor and capital incomes) ; moreover, for the same
amount of public money, the long run benet of increasing public investment in
medical R&D, is always higher that the one associated with subsidizing private
R&D.
17
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1 Since at = agt and mt = mgt, the representative
agent budget constraint (2) rewrites as an aggregate resources constraint:
ct + t+1  kt + t+1  pt
 [(1  k) skt + (1  p) spt + (1   l) (1  skt   spt)] f (t; t; agt; mgt)
(27)
On its side, the government budget constraint (12) becomes:
gt+1  gt = [kskt + pspt +  l (1  skt   spt)] f (t; t; agt; mgt) (28)
Substituting (8) in the Euler equation (5), one gets:
u0 (ct)
u0 (ct+1)
=  [k + (1  k) f (t+1; t+1; at+1;mt+1)] (29)
Observing that the homogeneity property of the intensive production func-
tion implies that its derivatives are homogeneous of degree zero: f (; ; a; m) =
f (; ; a;m), it follows immediately f (t; t; agt; mgt) = f (t=gt; t=gt; a; m).
NAC (4) becomes:
k + (1  k) f (t; t; at;mt) = p + (1  p) t
t
spt
skt
f (t; t; at;mt)
since rpt = (t=t) (spt=skt) f (t; t; at;mt).
Under this Assumption 3, we nd:
t =
1  p
1  k
spt
skt
t (30)
Then
rkt = f (t; t; at;mt) = f

t
gt
;
t
gt
; a; m

= f

t
gt
;
1  p
1  k
spt
skt
t
gt
; a; m

Under Assumption 4, we obtain:
'0 (xt) = f +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk
f =
sk + s
sk
f

xt;
1  p
1  k
sp
sk
xt; a; m

since (30) holds and
f =
s
sk
t
t
f =
1  k
1  p
s
sp
f
where s = 1  sk   sa   sm. Therefore,
rkt = f (t; t; at;mt) =
sk
sk + s
'0 (xt)
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Using the average tax pressure (18), under Assumptions 3 and 4, equations
(27), (28) and (29) write:
ct +

1 +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk

(t+1  kt)  (1  ) gt' (xt) (31)
gt+1  gt = gt' (xt) (32)
u0 (ct)
u0 (ct+1)
= 

k + (1  k) sk
sk + s
'0 (xt+1)

since
f (t; t; agt; mgt) = gtf

t
gt
;
t
gt
; a; m

= gt' (xt)
Under denitions (16) and (17), dividing both sides of (31) and (32) by gt,
one eventually gets:
yt +

1 +
1  p
1  k
sp
sk

(txt+1  kxt)  (1  )' (xt) (33)
t =  + ' (xt) (34)
On the other hand, the Euler equation can be revisited under Assumption
1:
ct+1
ct
=



k + (1  k) sk
sk + s
'0 (xt+1)
"u
So, we have:
yt+1
yt
t =



k + (1  k) sk
sk + s
'0 (xt+1)
"u
(35)
Substituting (34) into (35) and (33) gives the dynamic system (19)-(20).
Proof of Proposition 2 In the following, (1) we linearize the dynamic
system (19-20) around the steady state and we compute the Jacobian matrix,
then (2) we prove the saddle-path stability entailing the equilibrium uniqueness
under rational expectations.
(1) Di¤erentiating (19) with respect to dynamic variables (xt+1; yt+1; xt; yt)
and using (21-22), one gets,
"u

+ k
x'00
'0
dxt+1
x
   dyt+1
y
= '0x
dxt
x
   dyt
y
(36)
where the di¤erentials are relative to the stationary state.
Linearizing now equation (20) around the steady state, one has:

dxt+1
x
= [ (k   x'0) + (1  )'0] dxt
x
  y
x
dyt
y
(37)
where,
  1 + sp
sk
1  p
1  k (38)
19
We observe that (38) implies:
y =  (k  )x+ (1     x)' (x) (39)
Let "2  x'00='0 < 0 denote the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to
the ratio =g (capital per head over public spending). The linear system (36-37)
rewrites equivalently:"
dxt+1
x
dyt+1
y
#
=

"u"2

+k
 
 0
 1 
x'0  
k + (1     x)'0   yx
 " dxt
x
dyt
y
#
The trace (sum of eigenvalues) and the determinant (product of eigenvalues)
of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state are given by
D =
1


k +
'0


1     x    y


(40)
T = 1 +D +
1

y
x

'0

x  
+ k
"2"u

(41)
(2) We want to prove that the steady state is a saddle point. Since the system
is two-dimensional with one predetermined variable, saddle-path stability entails
equilibrium uniqueness under rational expectations (with or without transition).
In the (T;D)-plane, the saddle points match with the two cones:
 T   1 < D < T   1
T   1 < D <  T   1
As "2 < 0, (41) implies:
D = T   1  1

y
x

'0

x  
+ k
"2"u

< T   1 (42)
To show that the stationary state is a saddle point, one needs only to prove
that D >  T   1.
Substituting formulas (40) and (41) into D >  T  1, one gets the following
condition:
D >
1
2
1

y
x


+ k
"2"u   '
0

x

  1
or, equivalently,
 + k +
'0


1     x   
2
y


>
1
2
y
x

+ k
"2"u
Since "2 < 0, it is su¢ cient to prove that
 + k +
'0


1     x   
2
y


> 0 (43)
20
From equation (22) and denition (38), using  =  + ' we observe that
y = ' (1  )  x (  k) (44)
Replacing (44) in (43), we get:
 + k +
'0


1     x   
2
y


=  + (1  ) '
0


1  1
2
'
 + '

+

1
2
 + ' k
 + '
  1

'0x
'
'+ '+ k
  + (1  ) '
0


1  1
2
'
 + '

+

1
2
 + ' k
 + '
  1

"1'+ "1 ('+ k)
=  + (1  ) '
0


1  1
2
'
 + '

+

1
2
'+

1  1
2
'
 + '

k

"1 > 0
where
"1  '
0x
'
2 (0; 1)
Proof of Proposition 3 Before maximizing the welfare function (23),
we need to transform it in an appropriate form. We compute the welfare
function (utility function) along the balanced growth path: (ct; bt;mt; nt) =
(c0; b0;m0; n0) 
t, where  is the common (regular) growth factor: et  e (mt; nt) =
e (m0
t; n0
t) = e (m0; n0) 
t = e0
t (notice that the health good produc-
tion function is supposed to be homogeneous of degree one). Denoting e0 
e (m0; n0), one gets under restriction (24):
W = cu
1X
t=0
t ln
 
c0
t

+ cv
1X
t=0
t ln
 
b0
t

+ cw
1X
t=0
t ln
 
e0
t

= (cu ln c0 + cv ln b0 + cw ln e0)
1X
t=0
t + (cu + cv + cw) ln 
1X
t=0
tt
=
1
1  

cu ln c0 + cv ln b0 + cw ln e0 +

1   ln 

Equilibrium uniqueness under rational expectations (Proposition 2) requires
c0, b0, e0 to be compatible with the regular growth factor . Denition (10)
details the economic policy and implies at the beginning: (a0; b0;m0; n0) =
(a; b; m; n) g0 and e0 = e (m0; n0) = e (mg0; ng0) = e (m; n) g0. From
denition (16) one gets c0 = yg0. The endogenous growth of steady state
implies a regular growth path; under restriction (24), we obtain:
W =
1
1  

cu ln (yg0) + cv ln (bg0) + cw ln [e (m; n) g0] +

1   ln 

=
1
1  

cu ln y + cv lnb + cw ln e (m; n) + ln g0 +

1   ln 

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where g0  a0 + b0 +m0 + n0 is an initial condition.
As  and g0 are not choice variables, the problem of maximizing W turns
out to be equivalent to the following:
max

cu ln y + cv lnb + cw ln e (m; n) +

1   ln 

(45)
Under Assumption 4, the policy of public spending (10) entails:
~f (t; t; at;mt; pt) = 
sk
t 
sp
t a
sa
t m
sm
t p
1 sk sp sa sm
t
f (t; t; at;mt) = 
sk
t 
1 sk sa sm
t a
sa
t m
sm
t
' (x) =
f (t; t; at;mt)
gt
= f (x; (   1)x; a; m)
= saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm x1 sa sm (46)
'0 (x) = (1  sa   sm) saa smm (   1)1 sk sa sm x sa sm
where now   1 + (sp=sk) [(1  p) = (1   q)]. Still under Assumption 4 we
have: "1  x'0=' = 1  sa   sm.
Since "u = 1, one gets from (21) an implicit equation dening the stationary
state x:
 + saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm x1 sa sm
= 
h
k + (1   q) sksaa smm (   1)1 sk sa sm x sa sm
i
(47)
where, according to (18):
 = spp + (1  sp)  q (48)
Taking into account that ' =   , equation (21) becomes
 = 

k +
sk
sk + s
1   q

1
x
x'0
'
(  )

(49)
Substituting "1 into equation (49), noticing that s  1   sk   sa   sm and
solving for , the growth factor is now explicitly computed:
 = 
sk (1   q) kx
sk (1   q)  x (50)
Under Assumption 4, the implicit equation (47) becomes,
saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm =
(  k)xsa+sm
sk (1   q)  x (51)
Instead of maximizing the welfare with respect to policy tools (a; m; n; p;  q),
one maximizes it indirectly with respect to an alternative vector (a; m; n; ; h),
where h is given by
h    k (52)
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and nally compute (p;  q)
 using (a; m; n; ; h)
.
b is given by (11) and program (45) becomes
max

cu ln y + cv ln (1  a   m   n) + cw ln e (m; n) + 
1   ln 

(53)
Let us express y in terms of (a; m; n; ; h).
Using (38) and (48), we nd that
1  p = 1  
1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
sp
(   1)
1   q = 1  
1  sp + (   1) sk (54)
From (46) and (51), we know that
' (x) =
(  k)x
sk (1   q)  x (55)
From (21), we know also that
 =
  
' (x)
(56)
or, equivalently,
' (x) =
  

(57)
Replacing (54) in (55) and (55) so modied in (56) and solving for  , we get
 =

1 + x
   k
  
1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
 1
(58)
Substituting (57) and (58) in (39), we get
y = x

1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
(   k)   (  k)

(59)
Replacing (59) in (53) and using (52), we obtain
~W (a; m; n; ; h)
 cu lnx+ cu ln

1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
(h+ (1  ) k)  h

+cv ln (1  a   m   n) + cw ln e (m; n) + 
1   ln (h+ k)
We observe that x is determined by (51), where we have substituted (52),
(54) and (58):
saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm x1 sa sm = h+k +x (h+ (1  ) k)
1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
(60)
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where
 = b + a (a  b) + m (m  b) + n (n  b) (61)
From (60), according to the Implicit Function Theorem, we locally dene
x = x (a; m; n; ; h) with partial derivatives:
(xa; xm; xn; x; xh) =

@x
@a
;
@x
@m
;
@x
@n
;
@x
@
;
@x
@h

These partial derivatives can be computed by totally di¤erentiating (60).
xa
x
=
a  b + ' saa
(sa + sm)'  z (62)
xm
x
=
m  b + ' smm
' (sa + sm)  z (63)
xn
x
=
n  b
' (sa + sm)  z (64)
x
x
=
' 1 sk sa sm 1   (z +   k) x
' (sa + sm)  z (65)
xh
x
=  
1 +
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
x

' (sa + sm)  z (66)
where z     = h+ k  .
The optimal policy implements a vector (a; m; n; ; z)
 satisfying the fol-
lowing system:  
@ ~W
@a
;
@ ~W
@m
;
@ ~W
@n
;
@ ~W
@
;
@ ~W
@h
!
= 0
Noticing that, under Assumption 2,
@e
@m
1
e
=
m
m
;
@e
@n
1
e
=
n
n
we obtain
@ ~W
@a
= cu
xa
x
  cv 1
1  a   m   n = 0
@ ~W
@m
= cu
xm
x
  cv 1
1  a   m   n + cw
m
m
= 0
@ ~W
@n
= cu
xn
x
  cv 1
1  a   m   n + cw
n
n
= 0
@ ~W
@
= cu
x
x
+ cu
1
 (z +   k)  (z +  k)
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
(z +   k)   (z +  k)
= 0
@ ~W
@h
= cu
xh
x
+ cu
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
  
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
(z +   k)   (z +  k)
+

1  
1
z + 
= 0
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Substituting equations (62-66) and taking into account equation (60), we
get the following system. The optimal policy is a vector (a; m; n; ; z)
 such
that (a; m; n; ; z; ')
 is solution of:
saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm x1 sa sm = ' (67)
cu
a  b + saa'
(sa + sm)'  z   cv
1
1  a   m   n = 0 (68)
cu
m  b + smm'
(sa + sm)'  z   cv
1
1  a   m   n + cw
m
m
= 0 (69)
cu
n  b
(sa + sm)'  z   cv
1
1  a   m   n + cw
n
n
= 0 (70)
1 sk sa sm
 1 '  x (z +   k) 1
(sa + sm)'  z +
(1  ) (z + )
1 sp sk
sk
(z +   k) +  (1  ) (z + )
= 0
(71)
 cu
1 + x
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
(sa + sm)'  z + cu
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
  
1 sp+( 1)sk
sk
(z +   k)   (z +  k)
+

1  
1
z + 
= 0
(72)
where
' = h+ k   + x (h+ (1  ) k) 1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
(73)
Replacing (67) in (68) and (69), we obtain
m =
m
cw
cu
((sa + sm)'  z) + sm'
a  m + ' saa
(74)
n =
n
cw
cu
((sa + sm)'  z)
a  n + ' saa
(75)
Substituting (74) and (75) in (67) and solving for z, we nd
z ('; a)  ' (sa + sm) 
cu

a  b + ' saa

1  a   'sma m+' saa

cv + cw

a  b + ' saa

m
a m+' saa
+ n
a n+' saa

(76)
Replacing (76) in (74) and (75), we obtain
n ('; a) =
n
a  n + ' saa
cw

a  b + ' saa

1  a   'sma m+' saa

cv + cw

a  b + ' saa

m
a m+' saa
+ n
a n+' saa

(77)
m ('; a)  'sm
a  m + ' saa
+ n ('; a)
m
n
a  n + ' saa
a  m + ' saa
(78)
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From (73), we get
x =
'  z
z +   k
sk
1  sp + (   1) sk (79)
Replacing in (72) and solving for , we have
 ('; a)  1
1  
1  sp   sk
sk
1  '+(';a) k'(sa+sm) z(';a) + 1cu

1 
z(';a)+(';a) k
z(';a)+(';a)
'+(';a) k
'(sa+sm) z(';a)
z(';a)+(';a)
z(';a)+(';a) k   1cu

1    1
(80)
where
 ('; a)  b + a (a  b) + m ('; a) (m  b) + n ('; a) (n  b)
Substituting (79) in (70), we nd F1 ('; a) = 0, where
F1 ('; a)  '  saa m ('; a)sm [ ('; a)  1]1 sk sa sm


' z(';a)
z(';a)+(';a) k
sk
1 sp+[(';a) 1]sk
1 sa sm (81)
Eventually, replacing (79) in (71), we obtain F2 ('; a) = 0, where
F2 ('; a) 
'
1 sk sa sm
(';a) 1  [' z(';a)]
sk
1 sp+[(';a) 1]sk
'(sa+sm) z(';a)
+ (1 )[z(';a)+(';a)]1 sp sk
sk
[z(';a)+(';a) k]+(';a)(1 )[z(';a)+(';a)]
(82)
The optimal policy ('; a)
 is solution of the two-dimensional system (25-
26), where the functions z ('; a), m ('; a), n ('; a),  ('; a) are given by
(76), (77), (78) and (80), respectively.
After this system has been solved, we get a; m; n; ; z; ' and ; then we
compute b = 1  a   m   n, the growth factor   z +  and, using (79),
x. Finally,  is computed using (58), while p and  q are obtained as follows:
p = 1  1  
1  sp + (   1) sk
sk
sp
(   1)
 q = 1  1  
1  sp + (   1) sk
7.2 Appendix 2: Calibration procedures
Calibrating . Using (21) and (46), we get
 =
  
saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm x1 sa sm
(83)
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Replacing in (47) and solving for x, we obtain
x = sk
1   q

  
   k
Replacing in (83), we nd
 =
  
saa 
sm
m (   1)1 sk sa sm

sk
1 q

 
 k
1 sa sm (84)
that is the right way of calibrating the unobserved , given the observed .
From (14), the breakdown of the total amount of public spending into its
four components (investment without health, consumption, health R&D and
other health expenditures) takes the form:
(~a; ~b; ~m; ~n) =

at+1=at  a
gt+1=gt   a;
bt+1=bt  b
gt+1=gt   b;
mt+1=mt  m
gt+1=gt   m;
nt+1=nt  n
gt+1=gt   n

At the steady state (regular growth), we obtain
(~a; ~b; ~m; ~n) =

  a
   a;
  b
   b;
  m
   m;
  n
   n

(85)
Using (13) and solving for (a; b; m; n), we obtain (a; b; m; n)
T
= M (~a; ~b; ~m; ~n)
T ,
where
M  
2664
   (1  ~a) a ~ab ~am ~an
~ba    (1  ~b) b ~bm ~bn
~ma ~mb    (1  ~m) m ~mn
~na ~nb ~nm    (1  ~n) n
3775
 1
Numerically, we set  = 1:02, ~a = 0:0758432283057199, ~b = 0:758 728 816
8, ~m = 0:00371613521937185, ~n = 0:161711819707504, a = 1   a, b =
1  b, m = 1  m, n = 1  n, k = 1  k, a = 0:05, b = 1, m = 0:08,
n = 0:61, k = 0:08, in order to nd a = 0:510 790 285 2, b = 0:350 679 408 5,
m = 0:017 519 244 2, n = 0:121 011 062 1. Notice that a + b + m + n = 1.
Using (13) and setting also  = 0:442 237 723 3,  q = 0:442857763, p =
0:38085379464, sk = 0:75, sa = 0:23, sm = 0:01, sp = 0:01,  = 0:961 538 461 5
and using (38) with k =  q, eventually, we get from (84):  = 0:563096 6639.
7.3 Appendix 3: Public spending in France
Public spending and percentages in 2006.
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YEAR 2006 Billions € % of OverallTaxes Type of Public Expenditures
National Budget (3) 280,75 35,43%
After transfers to Local Public Administrations Health expenditures (2) 3,70 0,47%
including      Medical R&D expenditures (1) 2,95 0,37% Medical R&D
Other health expenditures 0,76 0,10% Health expenditures (excl. R&D)
Other expenditures 277,05 34,96%
          including  Investment (4) 10,27 1,30% Public investment
Consumption 266,79 33,66% Public consumption
Local Public Administrations (3) 101,32 12,79%
Health expenditures (2) 1,50 0,19% Health expenditures (excl. R&D)
Other expenditures 99,82 12,60%
          including                  Investment (4) 43,51 5,49% Public investment
Consumption 56,31 7,11% Public consumption
Social Security Administrations (3) 405,75 51,20%
Health expenditures (2) 125,90 15,89% Health expenditures (excl. R&D)
Other expenditures 279,85 35,31%
including      Investment (4) 6,33 0,80% Public investment
Consumption 273,52 34,51% Public consumption
European Union (U.E.) (3) 4,67 0,59% Public consumption
Overall Taxes (3) 792,49 100,00%
Table 6. Breakdown of taxes paid by French citizens by type of expenditures (2006)
Sources:
(1) Ministry of National Education, Advanced Instruction, and Research, quoted
in Fenina & Ge¤roy [2007], p. 43.
(2) National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE, National ac-
counts (base 2000), in http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/comptes-nationaux/.
(3) Report on 2006 National Accounts, quoted in Ministère de lintérieur, de
loutre-mer et des collectivités territoriales [2008], p. 34.
(4) 2006 National Accounts, quoted in Ministère de lintérieur, de loutre-mer et
des collectivités territoriales [2008], p. 40.
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